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ABSTRACT 
This paper explains in direct operational terms the method 
presently established by law to apportion the seats of the 
Canadian Parliament among the provinces, the so-called "amalgam" 
method. 
Canadian political history and common sense suggest fund- 
amental principles of equity that should apply to any method of 
apportioning representation in the parliament. Unfortunately 
the amalgam method satisfies none of these principles. 
There is exactly one method which does satisfy all of them: 
it is much simpler than the amalgam method, and is basically the 
one originally embodied in the British North America Act of 1867. 

PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION 
AND THE AMALGAM METHOD* 
M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young 
INTRODUCTION 
The amended Article 51 of the British North America Act 
that came into force on December 31, 1974 specifies a rule for 
apportioning representation in the House of Commons known as 
the "amalgam method". The name is well-chosen. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary the original meaning of amalgam 
is "a soft mass formed by chemical manipulation". The change 
of a single word in this definition well conveys the essence 
of the method. 
Its prime motivation seems to have been to guarantee that 
no province would ever lose seats thus incidentally guaranteeing 
that no incumbent would lose his. (By a quirk of fate, the previous 
method applied in 1971 would have resulted in gains for o n l y  two 
provinces: Ontario and British Columbia.) It is a subtle scheme 
that appears to favor the small provinces more than it actually 
does, and tends to work against the rapidly growing intermediate- 
sized provinces of Alberta and British Columbia. At the same 
time the method is so opaque and intricately contrived that it 
raises doubts about its equity while at the same time hiding 
the nature of the inequities and blunting potential criticism. 
* 
The authors are grateful to Professor Duff Spafford for con- 
structive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Members of Parliament expressed their frustration on this point 
in the 1974 debates that preceded its adoption: "I have said 
that the language of this bill is terribly complicated, convoluted 
and contorted, and the minister's smile suggests that he found 
it that way too. I still think it should be possible to find 
someone else to draft these bills rather than lawyers. 'I1 The 
reader who enjoys puzzles is invited to read the actual definition 
of the method in the Appendix, and to try his hand at computing 
the apportionment based on the population data given in Table 2 
below. 
Equitable representation is at the heart of democracy. 
The provinces of Canada have had, and are having, disputes over 
the share of political and economic power. A necessary step in 
dealing with these problems is to adopt a method of apportioning 
the seats in the House of Commons that is easily understood and 
fair, instead of one that is "almost as complicated as the 
Einstein theory. 11 2 
This article has several objectives: first, to explain the 
amalgam method in operational terms and to show by example why 
it is so fundamentally bad; second, to identify principles of 
equity embedded in Canadian precedent and in common sense that 
should govern the allocation of seats to provinces; third, to 
explain that there is a simple and natural method that satisfies 
all of the principles--in fact, there is only one such method. 
The principles themselves determine the method. 
Brief Historv 
Before trying to unravel the amalgam method, it is helpful to take a 
brief look at its antecedents in Canadian history.3 The original 
Article 51 of the British North America Act specified a very 
simple and natural method of a type still used in pany countries 
today. The idea is to select a target number of constituents 
per representative, or divisor x, and then to divide the popu- 
lation of every province by x to obtain its quotient, a whole 
number plus a fraction. If the fraction is less than one-half 
t h e  p r o v i n c e ' s  q u o t i e n t  i s  rounded down, i f  more t h a n  one-half  
it i s  rounded up, and t h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  f o r  t h e  
p rov ince .  The A c t  f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i e d  what x had t o  b e ,  namely, 
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  Quebec d i v i d e d  by 65. I n  o t h e r  words, Quebec 
g o t  65 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and de te rmined  t h e  i d e a l  c o n s t i t u e n c y  
s i z e  t o  be  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r  p rov ince s .  There  was a l s o  a  
s p e c i a l  p r o v i s o  t h a t  no p rov ince  cou ld  l o s e  s e a t s  u n l e s s  i t s  
p o p u l a t i o n  had d e c r e a s e d  a t  l e a s t  5% from t h e  p r eced ing  census .  
T h i s  was amended i n  1915 t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  no p r o v i n c e  shou ld  
e v e r  r e c e i v e  fewer s e a t s  t h a n  t h e  number o f  i t s  s e n a t o r s .  
T h i s  approach,  w i t h o u t  t h e  s p e c i a l  way o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  x 
was f i r s t  proposed i n  1832 by Sena to r  Dan i e l  Webster o f  Mass- 
a c h u s e t t s .  I t  i s  t h e  most o f t e n  used method i n  Uni ted  S t a t e s  h i s t o r y  
(under  t h e  name "method o f  major  f r a c t i o n s " ) ,  and a  s l i g h t  
v a r i a n t  o f  it i s  employed i n  Scand inav ia  where it i s  known a s  
u 
t h e  method o f  "odd numbers". 
The r e s u l t  o f  app ly ing  t h e  method t o  t h e  1971 p o p u l a t i o n s ,  
w i t h  Quebec a s s i g n e d  t h e  75 s e a t s  it now h a s  ( i n s t e a d  o f  65) and 
f l o o r s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  number o f  s e n a t o r s ,  i s  shown i n  
Tab le  1 .  

Province 1971 Population 
Ontario 7 703 106 
Quebec 6 027 764 
British Columbia 2 184 621 
Alberta 1 627 874 
Manitoba 988 247 
Saskatchewan 926 242 
Nova Scotia 788 960 
New Brunswick 634 557 
Newfoundland 522 104 
P.E. I. 111 641 
Floor 
Total 21 515 116 102 
Webster App't 
TABLE 1. Webster Apportionment with Divisor 80 370.187 
(Quebec's Population Divided by 75) 
A related approach is to divide the populations by a common 
divisor x and then simply drop the fractions, i.e., give each 
province the whole number in its quotient. This method was first 
proposed by Thomas Jefferson in 1792 and is used in many propor- 
tional representation systems under the name "dlHondt's method". 
Still another variation on this theme, due to John Quincy Adams, 
is to give an extra representative for every fraction; in other 
words to round every quotient up to the next largest whole 
number. 
These three methods are all examples of divisor methods, 
because they are all based on a common divisor x together with 
a rule that tells when to round a quotient up or down.5 The choice 
of a divisor x determines the total number of representatives or 
house size: the smaller x is, the larger will be the house. 
However, it is also always possible to first fix the house size 
and then find some choice of x that results in an apportionment 
of precisely this number of seats. 
The next event in Canadian apportionment history occurred in 
1946, when a different approach was adopted. The total number 
of seats to be shared by the ten provinces was set at 254, and 
each province's fair share was calculated by multiplying 254 by 
the fraction which the province's population represented of the 
whole. Seats were allotted by first giving each province the 
whole number in its fair share, and then distributing whatever 
seats remained, one each, to the provinces having largest re- 
mainders. If by this process some provinces received fewer seats 
than their number of senators, these were allotted, by exception, 
numbers of seats equal to their number of senators. In the latter 
event, the method was reapplied to the other provinces to dis- 
tribute the total of 254 seats less those allotted by exception. 
This method (without the complicated way of handling minimum 
requirements) had been proposed in the United States as early as 
1792 by Alexander Hamilton and was used for aperiod in the nine- 
teenth century until it was discovered to suffer from the peculiar 
anomaly known as the "Alabama paradcx". By Hamilton's method a 
province's representation can actually decrease when the number 
of members in the house is increased and all populations remain 
unchanged. This bizarre behavior of the method outraged U.S. 
representatives and led to its abandonment by the Congress. 
In 1952 came a further change in the Canadian law. 261 seats 
replaced 254, and a proviso was inserted that after a redistribu- 
tion no province could have its representation in the House of 
Commons reduced by more than fifteen percent (this to shore up 
Saskatchewan). However this clause brought with it the need for 
the further proviso that no larger province could have fewer 
seats than a smaller one. The very need to append this extra 
clause should have been a sufficient signal that something was 
fundamentally wrong with the method. 
The Amalgam Method 
In introducing the amalgam method on December 2, 1974 the 
President of the Privy Council stated, "the purpose of this bill 
is to provide for a new and equitable method of redistributing 
seats in the House of Commons among the provinces of Canada. It 
deals with a matter that touches the very fabric of our democracy, 
that is of deep concern to every Canadian. A just system of the 
representation of the people is the very life-blood of our demo- 
cratic process. "7 In fact the method (see Appendix) is so en- 
cumbered with loose-ends, codicils, and ad hoc categories that 
it cannot but beget a sense of doubt about its fairness in the 
mind of any citizen who tries to read it, 
Ignoring all the embellishments, the method is essentially 
Jefferson's, but instead of one divisor there are three. 
The provinces --other than Quebec -- are divided into three 
categories: large (those with population over 2,500,000), inter- 
mediate (those with population of at least 1,500,000 but not more 
than 2,50fllflr)n) and small (those with population less than 
1.,500,01)0). Quebec is in a category hy itself. 
Quebec  is to be assigned 75 seats in the reapportionment 
based on the 1971 census, and an additional 4 seats in every 
subsequent reapportionment. The divisor x is defined to be Q 
Quebec's population divided by its assigned number of seats. 
In 1971 x = 80 370.19. Q 
In allocating seats within each category the following three 
exceptions a l w a y s  a p p l y :  
(1) No province may receive fewer seats than it had at the 
previous apportionment; 
(2) No province may receive fewer seats than the whole 
number contained in its population divided by x and Q; 
(3) A larger province may never receive fewer seats than a 
smaller province. 
The number of seats for each l a r g e  province is found 
applying Jefferson's method with divisor x that is, by di- Q' 
viding x into its population and dropping the fraction. Thus Q 
for Ontario divide 7 703 106 by xg = 8 0  370.19 to obtain 95.545, 
which implies 95 seats. 
The divisor for the small provinces, xS, is defined to be 
the average constituency size of the small states at the 
p r e v i o u s  apportionment, that is, the sum of the populations 
of the provinces that were small at the previous census, di- 
vided by the number of seats they received at the apportionment 
after that census. The number of seats for each small province 
is found by applying Jefferson's method to the populations of 
this census using the divisor x ~ .  
The 1961 data (see Table 2) yields the value xS = 65 925.14. 
For example, Newfoundland has 1971 population 522 104, which 
divided by xS gives 7.92, so it receives 7 seats. New Brunswick 
has 1971 population 634 557, which divided by xS gives 9.63, so 
it receives 9 seats; but 9 is less than it had before, so it must 
receive 10. 
The divisor for the intermediate provinces, xI, is defined 
to be the total population of the current small provinces, di- 
vided by their total allotment as found above. In other words, 
x is the average constituency size of the small provinces re- I 
sulting from the new apportionment. To find the number of seats 
for each intermediate province, divide its population by xI, add 
the resulting quotient to the province's previous number of seats, 
divide the sum by 2, and drop the fraction. 
This rule has an alternative description. To begin, compute 
the province's population divided by xI, drop the fraction and 
subtract from it the number of seats the province had at the 
previous apportionment. This difference is the increase in re- 
presentation due the province if Jefferson's method were used 
with divisor xI. To determine the province's apportionment take 
one-half of this difference, drop the fraction, and add the result 
to the previous number of seats. Therefore, if the "increase due1' 
is an even number the province gains half that number (e.g., if 
2 it gains 1); if it is odd it gains less than half (e.g., if 1 
it gains 0). 
The six small provinces in 1971 have (from above) electoral 
quotient xI = 66 195.85, Alberta has population 1 627 874 in 1971 
and had btfore 19 seats. Its population divided by xI is 24.59, 
which would imply 24 seats. Alternatively, the "increase due" 
is 24 minus 19 or 5, so its apportionment is increased by 2 seats. 
British Columbia's 28 seats is computed similarly. 
This completes the basic description of the amalgam method, 
though there are other exceptions and special clauses. One is 
that if a province is not large and declined in population from 
the preceding decennial census, then it receives the same number 
of seats that it had before. A higher order exception states 
that if several exceptions arise together then the one most ad- 
vantageous to a province dominates. 
Finally, it may happen that there are no small provinces 
at some census. In this case, to find the number of seats due 
an intermediate province by the amalgam method its current 
population is divided by the average constituency size of the 
intermediate provinces at the previous census, and the remainder 
discarded. 
Ontario 
Population Representation Population Senators Representation 
Quebec 5 259 211 7 4 6 027 764 24 7 5 
British Columbia 1 629 082 2 3 2 184 621 6 28 
Alberta 1 331 944 19 1 627 874 6 2 1 
Manitoba 921 686 13 988 247 6 14 
Saskatchewan 925 181 13 926 242 6 14 
Nova Scotia 737 007 11 788 960 10 11 
New Brunswick 597 936 10 634 557 10 10 
Newfoundland 457 853 7 522 104 6 7 
Pri~lce Edward Island 104 629 4 111 641 4 4 
Total 18 200 621 262 21 515 116 102 279 
Total population of small 5 076 236 
Total representatives of small 77 
Electoral quotient of small 65925.14 
Table 2. 1961 and 1971 Populations and Apportionments 
Principles and Paradoxes 
What is wrong with the amalgam method? That it is a crazy- 
quilt of ad hoc recipes, loose-ends, and exceptions, is evident. 
More fundamentally, it conceals grave defects that run counter 
to essential provisions of the British North America Act and 
violates the common sense of fair division. 
The amalgam method does not conform to the constitutional 
ideal of meting out representation in proportion to population. 
Proportionality as the ideal is clearly stated in the original 
Article 52 of the British North America Act which has never been 
altered: 
Article 52. The Number of Members of the House of 
Commons may be from Time to Time increased by the 
parliament- of Canada, provided the proportionate 
Representation of the Provinces prescribed by this 
Act is not thereby disturbed. 
Proportionality means that what really matters is the r e l a t i v e  -- 
not the absolute -- sizes of the provinces. The amalgam method's 
classification of the provinces by fixed numerical thresholds 
( 1  500 000 and 2 500 000) defeats this. For if the population of 
every province were to double, then the small provinces would be just 
as small relative to Ontario and Quebec as they were before. However> 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan would now 
be "intermediate" provinces, while Alberta and British Columbia 
would join the ranks of the "large". The result would be a 
decline in the share of representation enjoyed by these provinces 
even though nothing had changed in their sizes relative to the 
others. A reasonable method would award the same shares to the 
provinces whenever their relative sizes and the size of the house 
remained unchanged. 8 Hamilton's method has this property. So do 
divisor methods, for if all populations increase by the same per- 
centage then increasing the common divisor by this percentage 
will result in exactly the same quotients and so the same appor- 
tionment of the house as before. 
The amalgam method gives inconsistent results when all pop- 
ulations change at the same rate. It gives even more bizarre 
results when they change at different rates. Clause 5(2) (a) 
states that a larger province can never receive fewer seats than 
a smaller province. It is disturbing enough that such a clause 
is needed since a reasonable method would automatically be ex- 
pected to have this property. But, as is often the case with 
patchwork, no sooner is one hole plugged than a new and larger 
one opens. The clause concerns comparisons between provinces 
in any one apportionment. What happens as the provinces change 
in size? The amalgam method can  a c t u a l l y  t a k e  s e a t s  from a  
p r o v i n c e  t h a t  i s  growing i n  p o p u l a t i o n  and g i v e  t hem t o  one t h a t  
i s  s h r i n k i n g .  
For example, suppose it were discovered that British 
Columbia's 1971 population had been undercounted by 1000 persons 
while Alberta's had been overcounted by 168 000. The amalgam 
method would actually take one seat from British Columbia (whose 
numbers had increased by 1 000) and give it to Alberta (whose 
numbers had decreased by 168 OOO)! In other words, Alberta could 
have deliberately underreported its population, or encouraged 
emigration, and thereby gained a seat at the expense of British 
Columbia. 
The reason for this peculiarbehavior is that with a decline 
of 168 000 Alberta would have only 1 459 874 persons and there- 
fore would be classified as a small state. Applying the 1961 
small-province divisor 65 925.14 results in a quotient of 22.144 
and hence 22 seats for Alberta. This increases the 1971 average 
constituency of the small provinces to 66 239.33, which is applied 
to the intermediate provinces. The resulting quotient for British 
Columbia is 32.996, which, averaged with its previous number of 
seats (23) and rounded down results in only 27 seats. 
The phenomenon of a growing province giving up seats to a 
shrinking province is called the p o p u l a t i o n  paradox.  It can occur 
with the method of ~amilton' as well as with the amalgam method. 
This paradox cannot occur with a divisor method because the 
only way a growing state can lose seats is if its quotient de- 
creases, i.e., a larger divisor is applied. But then the 
quotient of any state that is shrinking or constant in population 
must also decrease, so it surely cannot gain seats. It can be 
shown mathematically that the o n l y  methods that avoid the pop- 
ulation paradox and satisfy certain regularity conditions are 
the divisor methods; 10 
An equally serious violation of the ideal of proportionality 
is connected with the minimum guarantees in the number of seats 
to be given each province. Beginning in 1915 Article 51A of the 
British North America Act mandated such floors: 
Article 51A. Notwithstanding anything in this Act 
a province shall always be entitled to a number in 
the House of Commons not less than the number of 
senators representing such province. 
Proportionality with minimum guarantees to the small was reiter- 
ated as the goal in 1974 by the President of the Privy Council 
(the Honorable Mitchell Sharp) when introducing the amalgam 
method : 
"Representation by population remains a treasured 
goal and constitutes an integral aspect of this 
method of redistribution... Within the group of 
the smallest provinces, representation by population 
will prevail except to the extent that the floor 
provisions may apply. Continued population growth 
in the small provinces would reduce their reliance 
on these floor provisions and lead to a reater 
degree of representation by population. II% 
Fixed floor provisions are a reasonable way of protecting 
regional interests and are found in many federal systems. But 
the analgam method has "moving floors", since no province is ever 
permitted to lose a representative. Rather than protecting re- 
gional interests this might better be called a provision to 
protect incumbents' interests. If populations keep changing 
relative to each other and representation is maintained propor- 
tional to population, the floors will keep rising and the House 
will increase indefinitely in size. Since, in addition, Quebec's 
representation is to increase at each subsequent reapportionment, 
the amalgam method gives no control on the total size of the House 
(e.g., reapportionment on the basis of January 1980 estimated 
populations would give some 306 members, an increase of 27). 
This is untenable. If on the other hand a ceiling is placed 
on the total membership together with floors that rise at each 
reapportionment, then gradually over the years proportionate 
representation will cease to exist. 
The only workable solution is to adopt fixed floors and to 
enable Parliament to choose whatever fixed house size it regards 
as reasonable. By imposing floor limitations, however, the ideal 
of giving each province its "fair share" of the fixed total number 
of seats must be modified. This is easily done. The fair shares 
are adjusted so that no province's share is less than its floor 
amount and the shares of those provinces which are above their 
floors are in the same proportion as their populations, the sum 
of all shares being the total number of seats. 12 
Table 3 shows the adjusted fair shares for the 1972 data 
(floors equal to the number of senators and 279 seats) and com- 
pares this with the amalgam method solution. Clearly the amalgam 
method does not meet the ideal of proportionality as nearly as 
it might --even allowing for the advantage given to the small 
provinces by imposing floors. 
The reason is that the amalgam method treats the provinces 
in three different categories "like the Three Bears",' each with 
its own divisor. The apparent effect of this categorization is 
to ensure that the intermediate provinces "fare a little better 
than Ontario and Quebec but not as well as the smaller provin- 
ces", ' or so parliament believed. In reality the method may make 
the intermediate provinces (Alberta and British Columbia) w o r s e  
off than Ontario and Quebec. A slight alteration of the 1971 
data shows how this can happen (Table 4). 
The small provinces have the same populations and distri- 
bution of seats as before, so the same divisor as before 
(66 195.85) is applied to the intermediate provinces. The re- 
sulting quotients for Alberta and British Columbia are 26.970 
and 32.939, which when averaged with their 1961 apportionments 
give 22 and 27 seats respectively. Neither would get more using 
Quebec's average constituency (80 370.19) as a divisor, yet both 
are worse off than either Quebec or Ontario in terms of average 
constituency size. The explanation for this apparent anomaly 
lies in the rule for dropping fractions. Alberta, with a 
population of 1 785 287 and 22 seats has an average constituency 
of 81 149.41 which is worse than Quebec's (80 370.19), but di- 
viding 1 785 287 by 80 370.19 yields 22.213 and the fraction 
must be dropped. This observation can' be used to construct other 
examples in which some of the small provinces are worse off than 
both the intermediate and the large provinces. 
In dropping fractions the amalgam method, like Jefferson's, 
tends to favor large provinces. The reason is that dropping a 
fraction of say .5 represents a much greater relative loss for 
a province with 6 seats than one with 60 seats. Adams' method, 
by contrast, tends to favor small provinces because it rounds 
all fractions up. Webster's, on the other hand, tends on average 
to be even-handed. The reason is that the fraction of any pro- 
vince will be just as likely to be above as below .5, independent 
of the province's size; in the former case it is favored by 
Webster's method and in the latter case not, so on average the 
two balance out. 15 
Table 5 contrasts the three methods for the 1971 populations 
and a uniform minimum of 4 per province, which was taken instead 
of the more restrictive number of senators to better show their 
differences. Notice that relative to the fair shares Adams' 
seems to favor the small provinces while Jefferson's favors the 
large. The Webster solution is nearest to the fair shares in 
the sense that it is not possible to transfer any seat and bring 
both of the provinces involved nearer to their fair shares. This 
is not true for either the Adams or Jefferson solution. In fact 
Webster's is the only divisor method that is always near the fair 
shares in this sense. 17 
Table 6 shows the solutions and the adjusted fair shares 
when the floors are set at the number of senators. 
Amalgam Method 
Province Floor(#Sen.s) Fair Share Adj-Fair Share Apportionment 
Ontario 24 99.891 98.287 95 
Quebec 24 78.166 76.911 7 5 
British Columbia 6 28.329 27 -875 28 
Alberta 6 21.110 20.771 21 
Manitoba 6 12.815 12.609 14 
Saskatchewan 6 12.011 11.818 14 
Nova Scotia 10 10.231 10.067 11 
New Brunswick 10 8.229 10.000 10 
Newfoundland 6 6.770 6.662 7 
P.E.I. 
Total 
Table 3. Adjusted Fair Shares versus 1971 Apportionment 
Province 
On tar io 
Population Amalgam Method App't Av.  Constituency 
Quebec 6 027 764 7 5 80 370 
British Columbia 2 180 412 2 7 80 756 
Alberta 1 785 287 22 81 149 
Manitoba 988 247 14 70 589 
Saskatchewan 926 242 14 66 160 
Nova Scotia 788 960 11 71 724 
New Brunswick 634 557 10 63 456 
Newfoundland 522 104 7 74 586 
P.E.I. 
Total 
Table 4. Example with slightly altered populations showing 
how the Amalgam Method may make intermediate 
provinces worse off than the large. 
Province Floor Ad j.. Fair Share Adams Webster Jefferson Amalgam 
Ontario 4 
Quebec 4 
Alberta 4 
Manitoba 4 
Saskatchewan 4 
Nova Scotia 4 
New Brunswick 4 
Newfoundland 4 
P.E. I. 4 
Total 4 0 
Table 5. Apportionment of 279 Seats by Methods of 
Jefferson, Webster, and Adams. 1971 Populaticns, 
16 
Minimum of 4 Per Province 
Province Floor 
-
Adj.Fair Share Adams Webster Jefferson Amalgam 
Ontario 24 
Quebec 2 4 
B.C. 6 
Alberta 6 
Manitoba 6 
Saskatchewan 6 
NovaScotia 10 
New Brunswick 10 
Newfoundland 6 
P . E . I .  4 
Total 102 
Table 6. Apportionment of 279 Seats by Methods of 
Jefferson, Webster, and Adams: 1971 Populations 
Number of Senators as Minima 18 
Conseauences f o r  t h e  Canadian Problem 
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e ,  p r e c e d e n t ,  and common s e n s e  a l l  p o i n t  
t o  c e r t a i n  fundamenta l  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  shou ld  govern  t h e  f a i r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e a t s  i n  t h e  House o f  Commons. 
One o f  t h e s e  i s  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i n c e s '  s h a r e s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
should  depend o n l y  on t h e i r  r e  Z a t i v e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  a b s o l u t e  
s i z e s .  Another i s  t h a t  a  l a r g e r  prov ince  should  n e v e r  g e t  fewer 
s e a t s  t h a n  a  s m a l l e r  p r o v i n c e ,  and i n  comparing d i f f e r e n t  prob- 
lems a  growing p r o v i n c e  shou ld  n e v e r  g i v e  up s e a t s  t o  a  s h r i n k i n g  
one .  T h i s  p r o p e r t y  must be  an  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  method i t s e l f ,  
n o t  t a c k e d  on a s  a n  a f t e r t h o u g h t .  
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  t h e  c o n s t i t u -  
t i o n a l  i d e a l - - s u b j e c t  t o  f l o o r s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  smaller p rov ince s .  
The c o r r e c t  s t a n d a r d  f o r  measur ing how c l o s e  a s o l u t i o n  comes t o  
mee t ing  t h i s  i d e a l  i s  t h e  p r o v i n c e s '  f a i r  s h a r e s  a d j u s t e d  f o r  
t h e i r  f l o o r  g u a r a n t e e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  should  n o t  be p o s s i b l e  
t o  b r i n g  t h e  p r o v i n c e s  c l o s e r  t o  t h e i r  s h a r e s  by a  t r a n s f e r  o f  
s e a t s .  Beyond t h i s ,  a  method shou ld  be even-handed i n  i t s  t r e a t -  
ment o f  s l ; : z l l e r  and l a r g e r  p r o v i n c e s .  And f i n a l l y ,  a  method 
should  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  House o f  Commons t o  be f i x e d  a t  any s i z e  
t h a t  may be deemed d e s i r a b l e .  
The amalgam method s a t i s f i e s  none of t h e s e  fundamental  p r i n -  
c i p l e s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a s  w e  a l r e a d y  knowr t h e r e  i s  a method 
-- W e b s t e r ' s  -- t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  a l l  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s .  I t  i s  a 
remarkable  f a c t  -- r e q u i r i n g  d e t a i l e d  mathemat ica l  proof  beyond 
t h e  scope o f  t h e  paper  -- t h a t  Webs t e r ' s  is t h e  o n l y  method 
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s .  19 
Our c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  Canada shou ld  abandon t h e  amalgam 
method and r e t u r n  t o  one  a l r e a d y  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  p r eceden t :  
Webs te r ' s  method w i t h  f i x e d  f l o o r s  and a p rede te rmined  house  s i z e .  
APPENDIX. - British North America Act, Article 51. 
A r t i c l e  51 .* (1 ) 'The number of members o f  t h e  House o f  Com- 
mons and t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  prov inces  t h e r e i n  s h a l l  
upon t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  o f  t h i s  subsect ion and t h e r e a f t e r  
on t h e  complet ion o f  each decennia l  census be read jus ted  by 
such a u t h o r i t y ,  i n  such manner, and f rom such t ime  as t h e  
Par l iament  o f  Canada f rom t i m e  t o  t i m e  provides, sub jec t  
and accord ing  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  Rules: 
1. There s h a l l  be  assigned t o  Quebec seventy - f i ve  
members i n  t h e  readjustment  f o l  1  owing t h e  compl e t  i on 
o f  t h e  decennia l  census taken i n  t h e  year  1971, and 
t h e r e a f t e r  f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  members i n  each subsequent 
readjustment .  
2. Subjec t  t o  Rules 5(2)  and ( 3 ) ,  t h e r e  s h a l l  be 
assigned t o  a  l a r g e  prov ince a  number o f  members equal 
t o  t h e  number ob ta ined by d i v i d i n g  t h e  popu la t i on  of t h e  
l a r g e  p rov ince  by t h e  e l e c t o r a l  q u o t i e n t  o f  Quebec. 
3. Sub jec t  t o  Rules 5(2)  and (3) ,  t h e r e  s h a l l  be 
assigned t o  a  smal l  p rov ince a  number o f  members equal 
t o  t h e  number ob ta ined  by d i v i d i n g  
(a )  t h e  sum o f  t h e  populat ions,  determined according 
t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  penu l t ima te  decennial  census, of 
t h e  prov inces  ( o t h e r  than Quebec) having popu la t ions  
o f  l e s s  than one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n ,  determined accord- 
i n g  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  census, by t h e  sum o f  t h e  
numbers of  members assigned t o  those prov inces i n  t h e  
read jus tment  f o l l o w i n g  the  complet ion o f  t h a t  census; 
and 
(b)  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  smal l  p rov ince by the  q u o t i e n t  
ob ta ined under paragraph (a) .  
4. Subjec t  t o  Rules 5 ( l )  ( a )  ,(2) and (3) ,  t h e r e  s h a l l  be 
assigned t o  an i n t e r m e d i a t e  prov ince a  nurr~ber o f  mem- 
b e r s  equal t o  t h e  number ob ta ined 
(a )  by d i v i d i n g  t h e  sum o f  t h e  popu la t ions  o f  t h e  
prov inces  ( o t h e r  than Quebec) having popu la t ions  o f  
l e s s  than  one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n  by t h e  sum o f  t he  
number of  members assigned t o  those prov inces under 
any o f  Rules 3, 5 ( l )  b)  , ( 2 )  and ( 3 )  ; 
( b )  by d i v i d i n g  t h e  popu la t i on  o f  t h e  i n te rmed ia te  prov- 
i n c e  by the  q u o t i e n t  ob ta ined under paragraph ( a ) ;  and 
( c )  by adding t o  t h e  numb2r o f  members assigned t o  
t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p rov ince  i n  t h e  readjustment  f o l l o w i n g  
t h e  cornpl e t i o n  of t h e  penul t i m a t e  decennial  census 
one-half  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  r e s u l t i n g  from the s u b t r a c t i o n  
of t h a t  number from t h e  q u o t i e n t  obta ined under para- 
graph ( b ) .  
*As enacted by t h e  B r i t i s h  N o r t h  America Act ,  S.C. 1974-75-76, 
c. 13, which came i n t o  fo rce  on December 31, 1974. 
5. ( 1 )  On any readjustment,  
(a)  i f  no p rov ince  ( o t h e r  than Quebec) has a  popula- 
t i o n  o f  l e s s  than one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n ,  Rule 4 s h a l l  n o t  
be a p p l i e d  and, sub jec t  t o  Rules 5(2)  and ( 3 ) ,  t h e r e  
s h a l l  be assigned t o  an i n te rmed ia te  p rov ince  a  number 
o f  members equal t o  t h e  number ob ta ined  by d i v i d i n g  
(i) t h e  sum o f  t h e  popu la t ions ,  determined accord ing  
t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t he  penu l t ima te  decennia l  census, of 
t h e  prov inces  ( o t h e r  than Quebec) hav ing  popula- 
t i o n s  o f  n o t  l e s s  than one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n  and n o t  
more than  two and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n ,  determined accord- 
i n g  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  census, by t h e  sum o f  t h e  
numbers o f  members assigned t o  those prov inces  i n  
t h e  readjustment  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  comple t ion  of t h a t  
census, and 
( i i )  t h e  popu la t i on  o f  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p rov ince  by 
t h e  q u o t i e n t  ob ta ined under subparagraph ( i  ) ; 
( b )  if a p rov ince  ( o t h e r  than Quebec) having a  popula- 
t i o n  o f  
( i )  l e s s  than one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n ,  o r  
( i i )  n o t  l e s s  than one and a  h a l f  m i l l i o n  and n o t  more 
than two and a  ha1 f m i  1 1  i o n  
does n o t  have a  popu la t i on  g r e a t e r  than i t s  popu la t i on  
determined accord ing  t o  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  penu l t ima te  
decenn ia l  census, i t  s h a l l ,  s u b j e c t  t o  Rules 5 ( 2 )  and (3), 
be assigned t h e  number o f  members ass igned t o  i t  i n  t h e  
read jus tment  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  complet ion o f  t h a t  census. 
( 2 )  On any readjustment ,  
( a )  if, under any o f  Rules 2  t o  5 (1 ) ,  t h e  number of 
members t o  be assigned t o  a  prov ince ( i n  t h i s  paragraph 
r e f e r r e d  t o  as " t h e  f i r s t  p rov ince " )  i s  sma l l e r  than t h e  
number o f  members t o  be assigned t o  any o t h e r  p rov-  
i n c e  n o t  having a  popu la t i on  g r e a t e r  than t h a t  o f  t h e  
f i r s t  p rov ince ,  those Rules s h a l l  n o t  be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  
f i r s t  p rov ince  and i t  s h a l l  be assigned a  number o f  
members equal t o  t h e  l a r g e s t  number o f  mer~bers t o  be 
assigned t o  any o t h e r  p rov ince n o t  having a  popu la t i on  
g r e a t e r  than t h a t  of t h e  f i r s t  p rov ince;  
( b )  i f ,  under any of Rules 2  t o  5 ( l )  ( a ) ,  t h e  number of 
members t o  be assigned t o  a  p rov ince  i s  s m a l l e r  than 
t h e  number of members zssigned t o  i t  i n  t h e  r e a d j u s t -  
nlent f o l l o w i n g  t h e  compl e t i o n  ~f t he  penu l t ima te  
decennia l  cmsus ,  those Rules ;ha l l  n o t  be a p p l i e d  t o  i t  
and i t  s h a l l  be assigned t h e  l a t t e r  number o f  members; 
( c )  if both  paragraphs (a )  and (b )  app ly  t o  a  prov ince,  
i t  s h a l l  be assigned a  nunher o f  rn2rnbers equai t o  t h e  
g r e a t e r  o f  t h e  numbers produced under those 
paragraphs. 
(3)  On any readjustment, 
(a)  i f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  q u o t i e n t  o f  a prov ince ( i n  t h i s  
paragraph r e f e r r e d  t o  as " the  f i r s t  p rov ince" )  ob ta ined 
by d i v i d i n g  i t s  popu la t i on  by t h e  number o f  members t o  
be assigned t o  i t  under any o f  Rules 2 t o  5(2)  i s  g r e a t e r  
than t h e  e l e c t o r a l  q u o t i e n t  o f  Quebec, those Rules s h a l l  
n o t  be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  prov ince and i t  s h a l l  be 
assigned a number o f  members equal t o  t h e  number 
ob ta ined  by d i v i d i n g  i t s  popu la t i on  by t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
q u o t i e n t  of Quebec; 
(b)  if, as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Rule 6 ( 2 ) ( a ) ,  t h e  
number o f  merr~bers assigned t o  a prov ince under para- 
graph (a)  equals t h e  number o f  members t o  be assigned 
t o  i t  under any o f  Rufes 2 t o  5 ( 2 ) ,  i t  s h a l l  be assigned 
t h a t  number o f  members and paragraph ( a )  s h a l l  cease 
t o  app ly  t o  t h a t  province.  
6. (1 )  I n  these Rules, 
" e l e c t o r a l  q u o t i e n t "  means, i n  respec t  of a province,  
t h e  q u o t i e n t  ob ta ined by d i v i d i n g  i t s  popu la t ion ,  
determined according t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  then  most 
r e c e n t  decennia l  census, by t h e  number o f  members 
t o  be dssigned t o  i t  under any o f  Rules 1 t o  5(3 )  i n  
t h e  read jus tment  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  complet ion o f  t h a t  
census; 
" i n te rmed ia te  province" means a prov ince ( o t h e r  than 
Quebec) having a popu la t ion  g rea te r  than i t s  popu- 
l a t i o n  determined according t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
penu l t ima te  decennia l  census b u t  n o t  more than two 
and a h a l f  m i l l i o n  and n o t  l e s s  than one and a h a l f  
m i l l i o n ;  
" l a r g e  prov ince"  means a prov ince ( o t h e r  than 
Quebec) having a popu la t i on  g r e a t e r  than two and a 
h a l f  m i l l  ion ;  
"penu l t ima te  decennia l  census" means t h e  decennia l  
census t h a t  preceded t h e  then most r e c e n t  decennia l  
census; 
"popu la t i on "  means, except where o therwise  s p e c i f i e d ,  
t h e  popu la t i on  determined according t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h e  then most recen t  decennial  census; 
"smal l  p rov ince"  means a prov ince ( o t h e r  than 
Quebec) hav ing a popu la t i on  g r e a t e r  than i t s  popu- 
l a t i o n  determined according t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
penu l t ima te  decennial  censur qnd l e s s  than one and 
a h a l f  m i l l i o n .  
( 2 )  For  t h e  purposes o f  these Rules, 
(a)  if any f r a c t i o n  l e s s  than one remains upon comple- 
t i o n  of t h e  f i n a i  c a l c u l a t i o n  t h a t  produces t h e  number 
o f  members t o  be assigned t o  a province,  t h a t  number 
o f  members s h a l l  equal t h e  number so produced d i s r e -  
gard ing  t h e  f r a c t i o n ;  
(b) i f  more than one readjustment follows the comple- 
t ion of a decennial census, the most recent of those 
readjustments s h a l l ,  upon taking e f fec t ,  be deemed t o  
be the  only readjustment following the completion of 
tha t  census; 
(c )  a readjustment shal l  not take e f f e c t  unt i l  the termi- 
nation of the then exist ing Parliament. 
(2) The Yukon Terr i tory as bounded and described in the 
schedule t o  chapter Y-2 of the Revised Statutes  of Canada, 
1970, shal l  be en t i t l ed  t o  one member, and the Northwest 
Terr i tor ies  as  bounded and described in section 2 of chapter 
N-22 of the Revised Sta tu tes  of Canada, 1970, shall  be 
en t i t l ed  t o  two members. 
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